Integrating electricity markets: Impacts of increasing trade on prices
  and emissions in the western United States by Dahlke, Steven
 
 
Integrating energy markets: Impacts of increasing electricity trade on 
prices and emissions in the western United States 
 
Steve Dahlke 
Colorado School of Mines Division of Economics and Business 
January 25, 2019 
Abstract 
 This paper presents estimates of the short-term relationships between regional electricity trade in the 
western United States (U.S.)  and prices, emissions, and generation. The estimates are conditioned on 
electricity demand and other unobserved effects, thereby controlling for confounding effects from these 
variables. Consistent with economic theory, I find a negative short-term relationship between electricity 
price in California and regional trade. Each 1 gigawatt-hour (GWh) increase in California electricity 
imports is associated with an average $0.15 per megawatt-hour (MWh) decrease in the California 
Independent System Operator’s (CAISO) wholesale electricity price. This is associated with significant 
short-term consumer savings in excess of the implementation costs likely required to set up a regional 
market. I also find a negative short-term relationship between carbon dioxide emissions in California 
and electricity imports that is partially offset by a positive relationship between exports and emissions 
from neighboring regions. On net, each 1 GWh increase in regional trade is associated with a net 70-ton 
average decrease in CO2 emissions across the western U.S. The results suggest electricity imports mostly 
displace natural gas generation on the margin in CAISO, with each MWh of imports associated with 0.88 
MWh decrease of CAISO natural gas . A small, positive relationship with SO2 and NOx emissions in 
neighboring states is also associated with increased exports to California. This is evidence that a small 
portion (less than 10%) of electricity imports into California are supplied by coal plants. This study 
suggests substantial short-term monetary benefits can be achieved from market regionalization for 
California consumers. It also provides evidence that California’s cap and trade program has been 
relatively effective in limiting the carbon content of imported electricity, even absent a regional or 
national cap on CO2 and related concerns about carbon leakage. The conclusions suggest policy efforts 
to reduce trade barriers should move forward in parallel with strong greenhouse gas policies that cap 
emissions levels across the market region. 
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1. Introduction 
Those working on research and policy in the electricity sector often think about optimal market designs 
to meet society’s energy goals at the lowest cost. To this end, centralized wholesale electricity markets 
have grown significantly in the United States (U.S.)  over the past two decades. Recent examples include 
the southward expansion of the Midcontinent Independent System Operator market in 2013, and the 
northward expansion of the Southwest Power Pool market in 2015. California is now deliberating with 
neighboring states about whether or not to regionalize its centralized market to increase electricity 
trade with neighboring states. 
The economic, legal, and social impacts of regionalizing California’s electricity market have recently been 
studied by various entities to help inform the political debate. For examples, see Chang et al, 2016; Brint 
et al, 2017; Hogan, 2017; Tarufelli and Gilbert, 2018. However, because regional market discussions in 
California have been renewed relatively recently, the current academic literature on the topic is 
relatively sparse. This analysis offers new insights to the political debate, including estimates of the 
short-term relationships of relevance for policy discussions on regionalizing California’s electricity 
market. Using electricity market data covering the western United States from 2015-2018, I estimate 
several econometric models that provide estimates of average short-term relationships between 
regional electricity trade and electricity prices, emissions, and generation. Looking to recent history as a 
reasonable guide, these short-term relationships provide empirically-based estimates of the near-term 
impacts of increasing regional trade across the western U.S. through a regional market.  
The analysis finds that from 2015 – 2018, a one gigawatt-hour (GWh) increase in California electricity 
imports is associated with an average $0.15/MWh decrease in wholesale electricity price. Extrapolation 
from this short-term estimate suggests approximately $252 million in annual savings for California 
electricity consumers can be achieved if imports were doubled from current levels. These annual 
estimates are calculated from short-term estimates and do not account for future market equilibrium 
adjustments. However, given the limited demand response in wholesale electricity markets and long 
time required to develop new electricity resources, short-term effects are likely to be sustained until 
market participants are able to respond via investment decisions.   The short-term savings estimates are 
much larger than the likely short-term market implementation costs; a similar regional expansion in the 
northeastern U.S. required a one-time implementation cost of approximately $40 million. This study also 
finds decreased carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in California associated with regional trade. These 
emission reductions are partially offset by increased CO2 emissions in neighboring states as fossil 
generators increase output to export to California. On net, each 1 GWh of increased regional trade is 
associated with a 70 ton reduction in CO2 emissions across the western U.S. Moreover, the models find 
that increased regional trade is associated with a small net increase in SO2 and NOx emissions in 
neighboring states outside of California, suggesting that a relatively small portion of California imports is 
supplied by out of state coal generation. This result reinforces the importance of having strong 
emissions policies in place that cover the full regional market, such as the U.S. Acid Rain Program for SO2 
emissions. Doing so will allow market participants to reap the benefits of a regional market without 
sustained increases in coal-related air pollution. 
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This paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides general background on electricity markets and 
recent developments in the western U.S. Section 3 presents relevant economic theory that produces a 
priori hypotheses on the effects of electricity market integration. Section 4 walks through each step of 
an econometric analysis. Finally, section 5 discusses policy implications, next steps, and concludes. All 
the datasets and computer code necessary to replicate the analysis are provided in an analytic appendix 
publicly available online at https://osf.io/hcdn2/  
2. Background 
For centuries, economists have puzzled over how to structure markets to maximize social welfare. 
Economic philosophy suggests the value of a market comes from its ability to make information 
available to both parties involved in an exchange. Efficiency increases when trading partners gain access 
to additional relevant information. The possession of relevant information allows market participants to 
reduce uncertainty, identify suitable trading partners and properly negotiate contracts (Hayek, 1945). 
Moreover, the cost to acquire relevant information and negotiate contracts determines the optimal 
organization of firms within a market (Coase, 1937; Riordan and Williamson, 1985). Centralized 
electricity markets are expanding across the U.S. because they increase availability of relevant 
information to market participants by posting prices, standardizing contracts, and eliminating costs 
associated with negotiating individual bilateral deals. They also eliminate export fees charged by 
transmission companies for transmitting power across market regions (Chang et al., 2016). An important 
question for the western U.S. debate is whether the marginal benefits from a centralized wholesale 
market outweigh the marginal costs of transitioning to such a market. While market implementation 
costs for the western U.S. are difficult to  estimate with precision, Mansur and White (2012) note that a 
similar market expansion in the PJM region in the northeastern U.S. had a one-time implementation cost 
of $40 million. This study suggests the immediate consumer savings from transitioning to a regional 
market largely outweigh costs of this magnitude.  
In addition to providing timely information for those working on electricity market policy in the western 
U.S., this paper builds on a broader scholarship on electricity market integration around the world. In 
the early 1990’s the European Union issued directives stating their explicit goal of an integrated 
electricity market, similar to what has occurred recently in California. Since then, there have been many 
studies evaluating the progress and implications of European electricity market integration towards this 
goal (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005; Newbery, Strbac, and Viehoff, 2016). There has also been working 
evaluating market power implications and the effects of integration on state-owned utilities (Domanico 
2007). There is also a body of research evaluating market integration among sub-markets within Europe, 
including Scandinavia (Amundsen and Bergman, 2007; Lundgren, et al., 2008), southeastern Europe 
(Hooper and Medvedev, 2009), Italy and its neighbors (Creti et al., 2010), and Ireland and its neighbors 
(Nepal and Jamasb, 2012). Other work has developed economic models to study effects of electricity 
market integration in other regions of the world, including eastern Asia (Gnansounou and Dong, 2004; 
Wu, 2013) western Africa (Gnansounou et al., 2007; Pineau, 2008), and across the western hemisphere 
(Pineau et al., 2004). Some analysis has been done characterizing the extent of integration within the 
Western U.S., (Woo et al., 1997; De Vany and Walls, 1999), and more recently on the emissions impacts 
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of increasing integration through western U.S. via recent growth in an energy imbalance market (Hogan, 
2017; Tarufelli and Gilbert, 2018).  
Electricity markets can be categorized into two general types of organization: Centralized auction 
markets and decentralized bilateral trading. The market structure in the Western United States varies by  
state. Trades occur over a grid of electric transmission lines called the Western Interconnection. The 
Western Interconnection is not synchronized with the eastern United States, and electricity flows 
between these regions are minimal. In the western U.S. outside of California, the majority of electricity 
companies are privately-owned firms that are state-regulated monopolies in the locations where they 
sell power. Most trade between companies utilizes decentralized, bilateral contracts. Within California, 
most electricity is transacted through a centralized auction market operated by an independent non-
profit entity called the California Independent System Operator (CAISO). CAISO collects bids and offers 
from buyers and sellers in California, and centrally schedules electric generation across the state to meet 
demand. CAISO also calculates and publishes prices designed to reflect the marginal cost of delivering 
electricity to each location throughout the state at a given point in time. 
Studies of other regions with centralized electricity markets have measured economically significant 
monetary benefits associated with the market. Mansur & White (2012) estimate $163 million in net 
gains from trade after expanding the centralized PJM market in the northeastern U.S., leading to roughly 
a doubling in trading efficiency compared to the bilateral market. Work by Chan et al. (2016) suggests 
efficiency gains to date from transitioning to centralized markets in the U.S. have induced behavioral 
changes among power plant owners that have led to savings in operations expenses by up to 15%. These 
past successes have prompted energy policy makers in California to engage in serious discussions about 
expanding California’s centralized market. In October 2015, California Senate Bill 350, the “Clean Energy 
and Pollution Reduction Act”, was signed into law (De León, 2015). Among other things, this bill 
established the intent of the California legislature to expand CAISO into a multi-state organization.  The 
legislation required CAISO to study the impact of a regional market, including overall benefits to 
ratepayers, environmental and emissions impacts, and more. The series of consultant studies referenced 
in Chang et al. (2016) is the market operator’s response to this directive. 
This CAISO-commissioned study identified $1-$1.5 billion in annual savings to California consumers from 
a fully-integrated regional market across the western U.S. Almost half of this is due to operational 
savings from increasing imports of lower cost power outside of California, equivalent to the short-term 
consumer savings empirically estimated in this study. The other half is due to savings primarily from 
electricity producers’ increased ability to meet California demand with large-scale renewable plants that 
can be more cheaply built outside of the state. These estimated savings are realized by California 
electricity consumers, and they do not incorporate effects on California electricity producers, nor 
consumers and producers in western states outside of California. Economic theory suggests that, all else 
equal, eliminating barriers to trade across a regional market will decrease consumer costs and producer 
profits in areas that increase imports, while increasing prices, producer profits and consumer costs in 
areas that increase exports. The increased price in exporting regions is a significant political-economy 
constraint that can impede market integration, to the extent that local policymakers work on behalf of 
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their electricity consumers. These issues are discussed further in section 3. California is a net importer of 
electricity during most hours of the year. As a result, economic theory suggests that increased regional 
trade will reduce California prices, consistent with the empiric results presented in this paper.  
3. Economic theory 
This section develops a basic economic model to illustrate effects of lowering barriers to regional 
electricity trade on producers and consumers. The approach is adapted from international trade theory, 
for example see Suranovic (2010). Consider an electricity market with two regions, a net importing 
region, like California, and net exporting region, like California’s neighbors. Electricity production levels 
at different prices for each region are represented by a set of supply functions indexed by region 𝑖 and 
time period 𝑡, 𝑆𝑖(𝑝𝑖𝑡 , 𝐴𝑖𝑡), where 𝑝𝑖𝑡  represents the electricity price and 𝐴𝑖𝑡 represents exogenous 
factors besides price that determine electricity supply. Wholesale electricity markets often use prices 
measured in dollars per megawatt-hour ($/MWh). In this case, quantity is measured in megawatts 
cleared and time period 𝑡 indexes hours. 𝐴𝑖𝑡 includes fuel costs, government subsidies and taxes, system 
capacity constraints, and other shocks to the generation and delivery network that impact producer 
costs. Consumer demand in each market is represented by a demand function 𝐷𝑖(𝑝𝑖𝑡 , 𝐵𝑖𝑡) where 𝐵𝑖𝑡 
represents exogenous factors besides price that determine electricity demand, including changing 
consumer preferences, weather, prices of related energy goods, income levels, and other shocks that 
impact demand.  
For this simplified example, assume two market regions so the set of market regions is 𝐼 = {1,2}The 
model assumes no constraints to the delivery of electricity within each region, so each region has a 
single market clearing price. Adding transmission constraints would create price divergence within 
regions, adding complexity to the model while not changing the general conclusions for this application. 
The model does assume transmission costs between regions. Transmission costs include charges levied 
by the transmission owner and transaction costs associated with negotiating individual bilateral deals to 
trade across regions. Let 𝑐𝑖𝑗  represent the unit cost to transfer electricity from region 𝑖 to region 𝑗. The 
transfer cost 𝑐𝑖𝑗  causes price to deviate across regions, such that they satisfy the following conditions in 
equation set (1). 
 𝑝1𝑡 + 𝑐21𝑡 = 𝑝2𝑡 + 𝑐12𝑡 
𝑐12𝑡𝑐21𝑡 = 0   
 𝑝1𝑡, 𝑝2𝑡,𝑐12𝑡, 𝑐21𝑡 ≥ 0 
(1)   
The equality condition in the second line of equation set (1) restricts electricity transfers to be 
unidirectional in each period. Thus, if region 1 consumers pay a non-zero 𝑐21𝑡 to purchase electricity 
from region 2, there will be no transfers in the other direction, and 𝑐12𝑡 will equal 0. Next, the 
equilibrium condition in equation (2) represents the quantity traded from region 1 to region 2 (𝑞12𝑡), 
and ensures that electricity transfers across regions are balanced. Positive values of 𝑞12𝑡 represent 
transfers of excess electricity from region 1 to region 2, and negative values represent transfers in the 
opposite direction. 
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  𝑞12𝑡 = 𝑆1(·) − 𝐷1(·) = 𝐷2(·) − 𝑆2(·) (2)  
Finally, I define a prohibitive trade cost equal to the value of 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡  that would make  the cost of 
transferring electricity from region 𝑖 to region 𝑗 prohibitively expensive such that no trade occurs. Let 
the prohibitive trade cost 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑜
 be equal to the smallest transfer cost such that no trade occurs, or 𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑡 =
0. This introduces a set of prohibitive trade cost conditions for the two regions defined in equation set 
(3). 
  𝑐12𝑡 ≤ 𝑐12𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑜
 
 𝑐21𝑡 ≤ 𝑐21𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑜
 
(3)  
In reality 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡  can be larger than the prohibitive trade cost. However, from a modeling perspective, any 
value of 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡  greater than 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑜 will result in no trade, which is the same  result as when  𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑜 . In 
both cases, trade is prohibitively expensive and all electricity demand will be met by local supply. 
Consumer surplus in each region (𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑡) is the value of consumption minus the amount paid by 
consumers, while producer surplus (𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡) represents the revenue to producers in excess of marginal 
production cost (McAfee et al., 2009). Consumer surplus can be calculated as the area under the inverse 
demand curve and above the market clearing price, while producer surplus can be calculated as total 
revenue minus the area under the inverse supply curve and below the market clearing price (equation 
set (4)). The sum of consumer and producer surpluses provides an estimate of the social welfare 
enabled by the market.  
 
𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑡 = ∫ 𝐷
−1(𝑞𝑖𝑡, 𝐵𝑖𝑡)𝑑𝑞𝑖𝑡 − 𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝑞𝑖𝑡
0
 
𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑞𝑖𝑡 − ∫ 𝑆
−1(𝑞𝑖𝑡 , 𝐴𝑖𝑡)𝑑𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝑞𝑖𝑡
0
 
(4)  
A single period representation of this model is presented graphically in Figure 1. Inverse demand 
functions are represented by downward sloping lines and inverse supply curves are represented by 
upward sloping lines. Any functional form for demand and supply where 
𝜕𝐷−1
𝜕𝑞
< 0 and 
𝜕𝑆−1
𝜕𝑞
> 0 will 
produce the same general results. In this example, region 1 has relatively higher production costs than 
region 2, creating an incentive to trade electricity from region 2 to region 1. Panel A shows a situation 
where trading costs are at or above the level prohibiting trade. Panel B models the market after trading 
costs have been reduced. In this case, 𝑞1
𝐷 − 𝑞1
𝑆 = 𝑞2
𝑆 − 𝑞2
𝐷 of electricity is traded from region 2 to 1. In 
the real western U.S. electricity market, trading costs would be reduced after the establishment of a 
centralized regional market due to elimination of transmission access fees and administrative costs 
associated with negotiating individual bilateral deals. 
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Figure 1 Effects of a reduction in trading costs on social welfare. 
A summary of the welfare changes from reducing the cost to trade across regions is as follows:   
• Consumer surplus in importing region 1 increases (𝐶𝑆1
∗ > 𝐶𝑆1). 
• Producer surplus in the importing region decreases (𝑃𝑆1
∗ < 𝑃𝑆1)  
• Consumer surplus in the exporting region decreases (𝐶𝑆2
∗ < 𝐶𝑆2)  
• producer surplus in the exporting region increases (𝑃𝑆2
∗ > 𝑃𝑆2).  
Furthermore, this model predicts that prices between trading regions will converge after trading costs 
are lowered. This is shown in Figure 1 as the difference in prices after lowering trading costs (𝑝1
∗ − 𝑝2
∗) is 
smaller than the difference before (𝑝1 − 𝑝2). In reality, price convergence has been empirically shown in 
several studies on market integration of European electricity markets (Balaguer, 2011; Kalantzsia and 
Milonas, 2010; Soares & Pereira da Silva, 2008; Zachmann, 2008). 
During the three years of this study’s sample period (2015-2018), California is on average a net importer 
of electricity from neighboring states. As a result, I predict that increased trade will produce net benefits 
to California consumers and net losses for California producers.  The opposite effect is expected to occur 
for market participants in neighboring regions that export electricity to California. While California 
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producers in aggregate may experience a net reduction in profits from reduced trade barriers, effects on 
individual producers may differ. For example, a regional market would provide access to additional 
outlets to sell excess solar power and increase profits for solar producers, as other centralized markets 
have done for renewable energy (Dahlke, 2018).  
While California prices are predicted to decrease, neighboring prices with lower-cost electricity 
generation are predicted to increase. Higher prices would incent investment in new generation capacity, 
enabling a second-order price reduction. However, in many regions political economy and social 
constraints exists that delay new electric capacity investment. In the face of investment constraints in 
the form of social opposition or monopolies, exporting regions are likely to face persistently higher 
prices that result in the transfer of economic rents from consumers to producers (Finon and Romano, 
2009; Billete de Villemeur and Pineau, 2012). In the case of states that export electricity to California, 
regulators can consider a variety of tax- or rate-based redistribution policies to mitigate harm to 
consumers after western market integration. 
The total effect on emissions from increased trade depends on the relative emissions contents of the 
affected generators in each region. If we denote 𝑒 as the average emissions rate from the affected 
generators in each region, then the change in total emissions (Δ𝐸) is represented in equation (5), where 
𝑞𝑖 represents the quantity supplied before lowering barriers to trade, and 𝑞𝑖
∗ denotes quantity supplied 
after: 
Δ𝐸 = 𝑒1(𝑞1
∗ − 𝑞1) + 𝑒2(𝑞2
∗ − 𝑞2) (5)  
In the example presented in Figure 1, more electricity is generated in region 2 to sell to region 1 after 
reducing barriers to trade. The overall effect of increasing trade on emissions in this example is positive 
if 𝑒2 > 𝑒1 and negative if 𝑒2 < 𝑒1. More generally, the total emissions effect depends on the average 
emissions content of the marginal generators that adjust their production in response to the reduced 
trade barrier. 
4. Analysis 
Electricity market data covering the western U.S. during the years of 2015-2018 were collected for this 
analysis. Generation and price data are available for CAISO, but not for other non-CAISO balancing 
authorities in California, including those serving the cities of Sacramento and Los Angeles. As a result, 
the analytic results for prices and generation are representative of CAISO only. Imports in these models 
come from neighboring states as well as from balancing authorities in California outside of CAISO. 
Conversely, emissions data is available for all of California. In this case, the model estimates the 
relationship between imports and emissions for California, inclusive of all balancing authorities in the 
state. Furthermore, the California summary statistics presented in this section include balancing 
authorities in the state that are not in CAISO. 
The data collected includes datasets that provide 5-minute observations of total CAISO generation by 
fuel type, demand, and average system price(CAISO, 2018; LCG Consulting, 2018).  Table 1 shows that in 
CAISO, electricity supply from solar and hydro have increased while natural gas decreased over the past 
four years. Other fuels have remained relatively constant, including imports, which supply slightly less 
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than 1/3 of CAISO’s electricity demand. Figure 2 plots the average daily fuel mix by hour in CAISO during 
2018, representing a “typical” day. It shows a daily reduction in natural gas and electricity imports 
during the morning when large amounts of solar come online, followed by significant increases at night 
when solar goes offline. If recent trends continue and solar capacity continues to displace natural gas, 
the need to rely on out of state electricity to balance daily changes in solar generation will grow.  
 
Table 1 Annual generation (GWh) and percent of total supply by fuel type, CAISO. Each column spans July 
1 - June 30 of the listed years. 
 
 
Figure 2 Average daily generation in CAISO, 2018. 
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The data collected also includes plant-level information and hourly electricity imports spanning July 
2015 (the earliest this data is available) through July 2018, from the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (U.S. EIA 2018 a, b). Power plants located in balancing regions that trade with California 
are plotted in Figure 3. All balancing authorities that trade with California are assigned to two regions, 
Northwest or Southwest, consistent with the organization of EIA’s electricity data. Table 2 lists all the 
electric balancing authorities in each region that trade electricity with California, as well as each region’s 
average net imports into California. It shows both regions have similar levels of electricity demand. Table 
3 presents the capacity mix of California plus each region that trades with California from 2016, the 
most recent year which plant level data is available. California generates the majority of its electricity 
using natural gas, while neighboring regions have a more balanced electricity mix between natural gas, 
coal, hydro, and other fuels. Hourly environmental emissions data were collected from the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency’s Air Markets Program database (U.S. EPA, 2018). I downloaded 
historic hourly emissions at the state level of sulfur dioxide (𝑆𝑂2), nitrogen oxides (𝑁𝑂𝑥), and carbon 
dioxide (𝐶𝑂2) for California and all states that trade electricity with California, from May 2014 – June 
2018. Both 𝑆𝑂2 and 𝑁𝑂𝑥  cause respiratory problems, while 𝐶𝑂2 causes climate change. All three of 
these pollutants are emitted from the combustion of fossil fuels, but natural gas emits only trace 
amounts of SO2 and NOx.  
 
Figure 3 Power plants in California and in balancing areas that trade with California, 2016. 
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Region Balancing Authorities in Region 
Average Net 
Imports (MW) 
Northwest 
Bonneville Power Administration, 
Nevada Power Company, 
PacifiCorp East, PacifiCorp West 
3,484 
Southwest 
Arizona Public Service, Salt River 
Project, Western Area Power 
Administration - Desert Southwest 
3,205 
Table 2 Balancing authorities and average net imports into California by region. 
               
Region Coal Hydro 
Natural 
Gas 
Nuclear Other Solar Wind 
California 1,703 11,751 44,791 2,323 5,502 11,026 5,976  
2% 14% 54% 3% 7% 13% 7% 
Northwest 11,129 23,366 16,196 1,200 1,691 1,680 7,713  
18% 37% 26% 2% 3% 3% 12% 
Southwest 6,115 5,926 10,736 4,210 165 1,014 237 
  22% 21% 38% 15% 1% 4% 1% 
Table 3 Electric generating capacity (megawatts) and percent of total capacity by fuel type and region, 
Prices 
The statistical modeling approach used for this analysis builds on a growing literature utilizing 
econometric-based methods with highly granular electricity market data to estimate short-term 
relationships related to various policies and electricity prices, emissions, and generation. This includes 
Callaway et al., 2018;  Carson and Novan, 2013; and Graff-Zivin et al., 2012. The analytic methods are 
discussed in the following sections. 
4.1. Prices 
This section describes the method for estimating the short-term relationship of increased imports on 
CAISO prices. The theoretical model presented in section 3 predicts that a decrease in trading costs 
across regions will decrease prices in the importing region, resulting in savings for consumers and 
revenue losses for producers. The econometric results presented in this section support this assertion. 
The model utilizes hourly data on imports, CAISO average system prices, and net load from July 2015 – 
July 2018, plotted in Figure 4. Net load is total demand minus non-dispatchable wind and solar 
generation. This is a more relevant variable for determining price on the supply side because it subtracts 
away noise in the form of wind and solar production that do not respond to short term changes in 
demand. Carson and Novan (2013) also utilize net load in a similar modeling framework for their study 
of energy storage in the Texas market. 
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Figure 4 Hourly CAISO average system price (top), net imports (middle), and net load (bottom). 
As the top panel of Figure 4 shows, the distribution of prices is positively skewed, with a higher 
frequency of extreme high prices than extreme low prices. I utilize a natural log transformation of price 
to more closely approximate a normal distribution and improve the model fit. Some prices in the dataset 
are negative. Since the natural log of a negative number is undefined, I shift the price series so that all 
prices are positive. This is done by subtracting the minimum price and adding 1 to all entries prior to 
calculating the natural log. This method allows for the preservation of negative price observations in the 
data. Shifting the data in this way does not impact the relevant variation within the data utilized to 
estimate the results.  
Electricity prices are serially correlated and have unequal variance, which will cause incorrect estimates 
of traditional standard errors. To obtain proper statistical inference, standard error calculation methods 
that are robust to heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation (HAC) are used throughout the entirety of the 
analysis, following the method implemented in Zeileis (2004).The data are more likely to show high 
levels of prices and imports during periods of high demand, confounding the bivariate relationship 
between price and imports. To deal with this, CAISO net load is included as a control variable. Other 
unobserved factors will also affect electricity price, including transmission congestion or changes in fuel 
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prices. To account for these external factors, I include a set of date fixed effects, which difference out 
daily price averages from the model. Doing this accounts for price effects from a particular day, month, 
or year from unobserved factors like persistent congestion or changes in fuel costs. As a result, the 
model estimates the average within-day relationship between price and imports, conditional on hourly 
net load. The model specification is described in equation set (6). 𝛼𝑑 represents the daily fixed effects 
that control for the average price each day caused by factors external to the model. The day fixed 
effects are programmed into the data as a set of variables equal in number to the total days in the 
dataset, with each variable equal to 1 during the 24 observations that occur during the respective day, 
and 0 otherwise. 
 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡
∗ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑡 + 𝛼𝑑 + 𝜖𝑡 
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡
∗ = ln (1 + 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 − min(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡)) 
(6)  
Table 4 presents results from this model. Column (1) shows results from a bivariate regression model to 
provide intuition into the data generating process. The positive coefficient of 0.014 indicates the 
observed simple correlation between price and imports is actually positive. This is because high levels of 
prices and imports both are more likely to occur during periods of high demand, transmission 
congestion, higher fuel costs, and other unobserved factors that increase the cost to supply electricity. 
The model in column (2) controls for these effects by including net load and daily fixed effects, and 
shows the relationship between prices and imports conditional on these other variables is in fact 
negative.  
For this reason, column (2) shows results from the preferred model specified in equation set (6). The 
coefficient on imports indicates that during the sample period from 2015-2018, a one gigawatt increase 
in net imports is associated with an average decrease in CAISO system price in the same hour by a 
multiple of e0.005, equal to 1.005, equivalent to a 0.5% decrease. This suggests an average short-term 
relationship  of -$0.15, or an average $4,017 in consumer savings per gigawatt-hour increase in imports. 
$0.15 is calculated as 0.5% of the average price observed during the data sample, $29.97/MWh. The 
consumer savings is calculated by multiplying the price effect by average CAISO electricity demand 
observed in the data sample (26,261 MW).  
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  Natural log of price 
  (1)  (2) 
Imports (GWh) 0.014*  -0.0051* 
 (0.0011)  (0.0010) 
Net load (GWh)   0.015* 
     (0.00045) 
Fixed Effects   Day 
Observations 26,303  26,303 
R2 0.032  0.29 
Adjusted R2 0.032  0.26 
Table notes:  
 
  
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors reported in below coefficients. 
* denotes the probability of the coefficient being zero is less than 0.01. 
Table 4 Results from price and imports models. 
These results suggest a doubling of interregional flows between CAISO and neighbors would be 
associated with an average CAISO price decrease of $1.09, corresponding with short-term annual 
consumer savings of approximately $252 million. These short-term savings are well in excess of the likely 
administrative costs required to setup the regional market. This is based off the $40 million one-time 
cost required to implement a similar market expansion in the PJM market (Mansur and White, 2012). I 
used a doubling of regional trade as the basis for the annual consumer savings calculation because the 
recent study commissioned by CAISO assumed regional market integration would roughly double the 
limits on interregional electricity flows (Chang et al, 2016). The immediate price reduction of  
$1.09/MWh from doubling regional trade is calculated by multiplying the average price marginal effect 
(-0.15) by the average level of net imports (approximately 7 GW) observed during 2015-2018. The 
annual consumer savings of $252 million is then calculated by multiplying the full price effect by average 
CAISO electricity demand and 8,760 hours per year. These empirically estimated consumer savings are 
similar in magnitude to the production cost savings predicted by the CAISO-commissioned simulation 
study. Unfortunately, price effects in neighboring states outside of California are not estimated in this 
study because public wholesale price or marginal cost data is unavailable for non-CAISO regions. The 
economic theory presented in section 3 predicts a price increase in these net-exporting states. 
The day fixed effects parameters (𝛼𝑑 in equation 6) control for daily average changes in the outcome 
variable, leaving within-day variation in prices and imports to use for calculating the coefficient 
estimates. In this way, the model nets out all unobserved factors that confound the observed 
relationship between price and imports that vary on a daily level. This includes controlling for different 
outcomes between work days and weekends, seasonal effects, and annual macroeconomic effects. It is 
possible there are short-term factors not included in the model that affect both the outcome variable 
and imports, including within-day transmission congestion, fuel costs, and outages in California. 
However, theory suggests all of these factors are positively correlated with both the independent and 
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outcome variables in that they cause higher CAISO prices and also make imports into CAISO more 
competitive. Thus, the existence of these factors would increase the estimated coefficient, suggesting 
the estimated effect provided in column (2) of Table 4 is a conservative, upper-bound estimate, and the 
true effect is more negative. 
In general, empiric economic studies often have difficulty disentangling the relative effects of supply-
side factors (like imports) from demand-side factors, because both sets of factors simultaneously 
interact to determine price.  However, in the case of wholesale electricity markets, most electricity 
consumers face prices that do not track short-term changes in wholesale prices. The lack of price 
response on the demand side minimizes the simultaneity bias concern. If we consider a case where 
consumers did in fact respond to short term changes in price, theory suggests simultaneity would 
positively bias the model estimate relative to the true effect. This is because if consumers did respond to 
short-term wholesale price signals, the reduction in price from increasing imports would be mitigated by 
a positive demand response. In this case, the true effect would also be more negative than the 
estimated relationship.  
Some degree of endogeneity is likely present between imports and electricity prices. In the short-term a 
CAISO price increase will incent additional imports into CAISO. In these models, a significant portion of 
electricity price variation is accounted for via the inclusion of CAISO demand as a control variable. 
However, unplanned generation outages and transmission congestion are examples of other factors that 
can cause high prices.  These effects cannot be directly controlled for due to data unavailability, but they 
are largely controlled for in an indirect manner by the inclusion of day fixed effects. In this context, the 
results can be interpreted as the within-day average effect of imports plus other within-day unobserved 
effects on price. To the extent that within-day unobserved variables that are correlated with imports 
cause price increases (including generator outages and transmission congestion),  the short-term 
relationship estimate in column 2 of Table 4 would be positively biased, and the true effect of imports 
would be more negative.  
4.2. Emissions 
In this part of the analysis, hourly data on carbon dioxide (CO2), sulfur dioxide (SO2), and nitrogen oxide 
(NOx) emissions from electricity generation by region are utilized to estimate the relationship between 
electricity imports and emissions. Hourly CO2 emissions in California, the northwest, and the southwest 
regions from July, 2015 until July, 2018 are plotted in Figure 5. Average emissions levels during the 
sample period for each region and pollutant are reported in Table 5.  
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Figure 5 Hourly CO2 emissions  by region, metric tons. 
       
  CO2 SO2 NOx 
California 4,018 42 622 
Northwest 11,138 11,281 14,279 
Southwest 8,751 5,248 16,022 
Table 5: Average hourly emissions by pollutant and region, 2015 – 2018, CO2 emissions are reported in 
metric tons, SO2 and NOx are reported in pounds . 
Figure 5 shows the SO2 and NOx series are highly correlated with CO2 emissions and follow similar 
patterns. Like the price data series, the distributions of emissions are positively skewed and exhibit 
similar patterns of serial correlation. To deal with these issues, a log transformation of emissions and 
HAC robust standard errors are utilized, similar to the procedure described in section 4.1. More 
specifically, models following the structures described in equation set (7) are estimated. 
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 ln(𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑡,𝐶𝐴) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑡,𝐶𝐴 + 𝛽2𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑡,𝐶𝐴 + 𝛼𝑑 +  𝜖𝑡
𝑎 
ln(𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑡,𝑟) = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑡,𝑟 + 𝛼𝑑 + 𝛾ℎ + 𝜖𝑡
𝑏 
𝑖 = {𝐶𝑂2, 𝑆𝑂2, 𝑁𝑂𝑥},   𝑟 = {𝑁𝑊, 𝑆𝑊},   𝑑 = {𝐽𝑢𝑙 1, 2015 ∶ 𝐽𝑢𝑛 30, 2018},   ℎ = {1: 24}   
(7)  
In the first line of equation set (7), 𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑡,𝐶𝐴 represents hourly emissions in California, where 𝑖 indexes 
each pollutant. 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑡,𝐶𝐴 represents hourly total net imports into California, 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑡,𝐶𝐴 is CAISO’s 
hourly net load, and 𝛼𝑑 is a set of day fixed effects, one for each day in the data sample.  In the second 
line, 𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑡,𝑟 represents hourly emissions by region, with 𝑟 indexing the Northwest and Southwest 
regions. 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑡,𝑟 represents hourly exports from region 𝑟 into California. Hourly net load data for the 
northwest and southwest regions are not publicly available. To make up for this, a set of 24 hour fixed 
effects are included to control for average intra-day variation in demand. For each region, the models 
are simultaneously solved for the three pollutants as a set of seemingly unrelated regressions  utilizing 
the method described in by Henningsen and Hamann (2007), and the associated software they built. The 
seemingly unrelated regression approach yields more precise estimates compared to a set of 
independent regressions by modeling the covariance between pollutants. 
Table 6 presents results for each region and pollutant. Columns 2, 4, and 6 include the preferred model 
specifications for CO2, SO2, and NOx emissions, respectively. The results show a significant decrease in 
California emissions associated with electricity imports. Conversely, the northwest and southwest 
regions show a significant increase in emissions associated with exports. These estimates suggest that, 
on average, electricity trade into California is being supplied by a nonzero portion of fossil generation in 
exporting regions that displaces some fossil generation within California. Each coefficient 𝛽 can be 
interpreted  after an exponential transformation (𝑒𝛽) as the average multiplicative increase in price 
associated with a one-gigawatt increase in imports. These are most easily understood as percentage 
changes. Considering column 2 for example, a one gigawatt increase in imports into California is 
associated with an 8.3% (𝑒0.080 = 1.083) decrease in CO2 emissions in California, a 2.6% increase in CO2 
emissions in the northwest, and a 2.4% increase in CO2 emissions in the southwest. Multiplying these 
percentage changes by the average hourly CO2 emissions level from 2015-2018 (previously displayed in 
Table 5) indicates that, on average, a 1 gigawatt-hour (GWh) increase in net imports into California is 
associated with a 321 metric ton reduction of California CO2 emissions . This is close to the CO2 
emissions rate for the average combined cycle gas plant in the U.S. (U.S. Department of Energy, 2016). 
Thus, it is likely that electricity imports are displacing marginal generation from combined cycle gas 
plants in California.  
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                  California Natural log of CO2 
emissions  
Natural log of SO2 
emissions  
Natural log of NOx 
emissions 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Imports (GWh) 0.030 -0.080*  0.024 -0.078*  0.017 -0.15*  
(0.013) (0.0030) 
 
(0.012) (0.0029) 
 
(0.019) (0.0044) 
Net load (GWh)  0.071*   0.070*   0.075* 
    (0.0012)    (0.0012)    (0.0015) 
Fixed Effects  Day   Day   Day 
R2 0.017 0.94   0.011 0.94   0.0038 0.79 
 
        
                  
Northwest Natural log of CO2 
emissions  
Natural log of SO2 
emissions  
Natural log of NOx 
emissions 
Exports (GWh) -0.057* 0.026*  -0.062* 0.034*  -0.066* 0.030* 
  (0.017) (0.0026)  (0.019) (0.0027)  (0.019) (0.0027) 
Fixed Effects  D,H   D,H   D,H 
R2 0.069 0.96   0.058 0.95   0.071 0.95 
 
        
                  
Southwest Natural log of CO2 
emissions  
Natural log of SO2 
emissions  
Natural log of NOx 
emissions 
Exports (GWh) 0.074* 0.024*  0.11* 0.035*  0.095* 0.018* 
  (0.012) (0.0049)  (0.015) (0.0072)  (0.015) (0.0066) 
Fixed Effects  D,H   D,H   D,H 
R2 0.17 0.92   0.19 0.84   0.14 0.94 
Table notes: 
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. 
* denotes the probability of the coefficient being zero is less than 0.01 
"D,H" stands for day and hour fixed effects. 
All models are estimated with 26,253 data observations. 
Adjusted R2 values are within 0.01 of the reported simple R2 for all models. 
Table 6 Results from emissions models. 
All the estimated emissions effects for each pollutant and region are presented in Table 7. The decrease 
in California CO2 is partially offset by emissions increases in its neighboring regions. One GWh of exports 
to California is associated with a 284 metric ton increase in the Northwest region, or a 214 metric ton 
increase in the Southwest. A direct comparison of emissions effects between California and its neighbors 
requires taking the average of the emissions changes for the exporting regions, weighted by average 
California trade levels, shown in the fourth row of Table 7. Doing this suggests that every 1 GWh 
increase in trade is associated with a net reduction in CO2 emissions by 70 tons, and net increases in SO2 
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and NOx emissions of 283 and 270 lbs., respectively. The estimated effects for each pollutant and region 
are presented in Table 7, with the overall net changes for each pollutant calculated in the bottom row.  
    
  CO2 SO2 NOx 
California -321 -3 -90 
Northwest 284 383 421 
Southwest 214 181 294 
Weighted Avg - NW & SW 251 286 360 
Net change (row 1 plus row 4) -70 283 270 
Table 7 Estimated change in emissions due to 1 GWh increase in trade. CO2 is measured in metric tons, 
SO2 and NOx are measured in pounds. 
The positive relationship between trade and SO2 and NOx emissions provide evidence that some coal 
plants in both the Northwest and Southwest regions are increasing on the margin when exports to 
California increase. This is because natural gas plants only emit trace amounts of these pollutants. Coal 
plants range widely in SO2 and NOx emissions rates, depending on the environmental technology at the 
plant and type of coal combusted. In 2015, the average SO2 emissions rate for coal in the U.S. was 
approximately 3,622 lbs./GWh (U.S. EIA, 2017). Using this national average as an estimate of the rate in 
the northwest and southwest regions suggests that less than 10% of each GWh of California imports on 
average is supplied by coal.  
SO2 emissions are subject to national caps in the United States under the acid rain program. As a result, 
increasing regional trade between U.S. states will not lead to long-term changes in these emissions. 
Instead, the short-term increases in SO2 associated with increasing regional trade must be offset by 
emissions reductions elsewhere in order to keep pollutant levels under the cap. As regional trade 
increases, emitting producers will increase profits by selling at a higher price to California consumers. 
These profits will be offset somewhat by having to pay for emissions reductions elsewhere in order to 
meet the SO2 cap. NOx emissions are not subject to a national or regional cap in the western U.S. As a 
result, increases in NOx emissions due to regional trade are more likely to be sustained long term. To 
eliminate long-term NOx emissions increases from regional electricity trade, it is important that an 
effective NOx emissions cap is put in place throughout the regional market.  
California currently caps domestic CO2 emissions as well as CO2 emissions from out of state producers 
who sell into California. Neighboring states do not have caps in place (Fowlie and Cullenward, 2018). 
Despite the lack of CO2 policy in neighboring states, the fact that measured CO2 emissions impacts from 
increased regional trade are still net negative suggests that California’s cap and trade program has been 
relatively effective in limiting the carbon content of imported electricity, and minimizing emissions 
leakage to neighbors. Despite this evidence suggesting minimal leakage, recent research suggests 
leakage may be an important issue for California (Hogan, 2017; Tarufelli and Gilbert, 2017). 
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In Table 6, columns 1, 3, and 5 report results from simple bivariate regressions of emissions, to provide 
additional intuition into the data generating processes. In California and the Southwest, results from the 
bivariate regressions are greater than the multiple regressions. This is likely due to similar reasons as the 
price model in section 4.1: periods with both high emissions and high imports are positively correlated 
with periods of high demand and other supply factors that increase cost, which positively bias the 
bivariate results. Once the models condition on these other variables, the positive inflationary effect 
disappears. The northwest region shows the opposite effect in that the bivariate regression result is less 
than the multiple regression result. Unlike in California and the southwest, the northwest region has 
peak electricity demand during the winter due to electric heating. Figure 6 plots relative monthly 
demand levels for these regions. It shows the northwest region demand peaks in the winter while the 
other regions peak in the summer. As a result, periods with high exports into California occur during 
periods with relatively lower local emissions in the northwest, resulting in an opposite, deflationary 
effect impacting the bivariate model relative to the multiple regression model.  
 
Figure 6 Index of average monthly electricity sales by region, 2015-2017. 
Examining the residuals of the regression models illustrates the benefit of utilizing day fixed effects. The 
top panel of Figure 7 plots the residuals from a regression model of CO2 emissions with imports and net 
load as covariates, while the bottom plots the residuals from the same model except day fixed effects 
are included. The residuals in the top panel show non-stationary trends, in that different subsets of the 
data have non-zero means. This is problematic for model estimation. The residuals from the model with 
day fixed effects show a stationary series that more closely approximates white noise, indicating more 
efficient model estimates. The residuals still exhibit heteroskedasticity in that the variance of the series 
is not constant, and autocorrelation in that values are correlated with prior values. These issues are 
present across all the models estimated in this analysis, and are addressed by using HAC robust standard 
errors for inference of coefficient estimates. 
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Figure 7 Residuals from California CO2 models with and without fixed effects. 
4.3. Generation 
The set of generation models for this analysis are designed to better understand the relationship 
between regional electricity trade and dispatchable electric generation in CAISO. Hourly generation data 
for nuclear, hydro, and natural gas generation are utilized, and plotted in Figure 8. The same electric 
interchange data from EIA, along with hourly generation data from CAISO, are used. The model is 
summarized in equation (8).  
 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑡 + 𝛼𝑑 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
𝑖 = {𝑛𝑢𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑟, ℎ𝑦𝑑𝑟𝑜, 𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑎𝑠},   𝑑 = {𝐽𝑢𝑙 1, 2015 ∶ 𝐽𝑢𝑛 30, 2018} 
(8)  
The three equations for each type of generation are simultaneously estimated as a set of seemingly 
unrelated regressions, the results of which are presented in Table 8. Like in previous sections, results 
from bivariate regressions are also included, although the models including net load day fixed effects 
presented in columns 2, 4, and 6 represent the preferred specifications. For all three fuel types, the 
bivariate model results are larger than the models with additional control variables. This is due to the 
inflationary effect from the fact that high levels of both imports and generation occur during periods of 
high demand. 
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Figure 8 Hourly CAISO generation by fuel type.  
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    Nuke (GWh)  Hydro (GWh)  Gas (GWh) 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) 
Imports (GWh) 0.00 0.00  0.072*  -0.077*  0.47* -0.61* 
 (0.01) (0.00)  (0.023)  (0.0039)  (0.11) (0.011) 
Netload (GWh)  0.00    0.15*   0.70* 
    (0.00)    
 
(0.0021)    
(0.0054
) 
Fixed Effects  Day    Day   Day 
R2 0.00 0.99   0.014  0.98   0.045 0.96 
Table Notes: 
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. 
* denotes the probability of the coefficient being zero is less than 0.01. 
All models are estimated with 26,300 data observations. 
Adjusted R2 values are within 0.01 of the simple R2 for all models. 
Table 8 Results from generation models. 
The results in Table 8 show that electricity imports have no observed short-term relationship with 
nuclear energy. As shown in the first panel in Figure 8, nuclear energy in CAISO often remains constant, 
and is not subjected to intra-day fluctuations. Occasionally, nuclear shows large changes in output, 
driven by a relatively few large units turning on and off. These changes occur too infrequently for any 
meaningful short-term statistical relationship to be estimated. As a result, the model returns a result of 
zero. The remaining results for hydro and natural gas suggest that every GWh of electricity imports is 
associated with an average 0.69 GW decrease in dispatchable generation in CAISO. Approximately 0.08 
GW of this decrease is from hydro and the remaining 0.61 GW is from natural gas. The fact that natural 
gas makes up the majority of generation displaced by imports is consistent with the emissions results 
estimated in section 4.2.  
5. Conclusions 
In summary, this paper analyzes short-term market relationships relevant to increasing regional 
electricity trade between California and neighboring states. Specifically, it provides evidence 
characterizing potential short-term effects of increased regional trade on prices, emissions and 
generation. The study finds that from 2015 – 2018, a one GWh increase in California imports was 
associated with an average $0.15/MWh decrease in the CAISO system electricity price, or $4,017 in 
consumer savings. Extrapolating these results suggest that a doubling of imports would produce 
approximately $252 million in annual savings for CAISO consumers. This estimate does not include long-
term effects that would accrue from changes in investment decisions due to changing regional trade 
patterns, which other studies suggest will offset price effects in the long-term while produce additional 
avenues for savings for California consumers by enabling more cost-effective capacity investments. Due 
to data limitations, this study does not consider price impacts outside of California from increased 
regional trade. Electricity market integration studies from other regions, along with economic theory 
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and the fact that California is a net importer of electricity on average suggests that increased regional 
trade will cause higher prices outside of California. This will partially offsetting the savings experienced 
in California and generate political economy concerns related to short-term rent transfers from 
consumers to producers outside of California. 
This analysis also finds that a 1 GWh increase in trade is associated with a 321 metric ton reduction in 
CO2 emissions from California power plants. Taking account of the offsetting effect from increased CO2 
emissions in neighboring regions suggests a net 70 ton decrease in CO2 emissions for each GWh 
increase in regional trade. Short-term net increases in NOx and SO2 outside of California are also 
observed, suggesting a small portion of exports to California is supplied by coal generation. As a result, 
increasing trade through a regional market will likely increase long term NOx emissions absent a NOx 
emissions cap. 
From the perspective of a researcher or analyst, one way centralized electricity markets are useful is 
that they produce lots of highly granular data that provide the basis for studies like this. It is currently 
difficult to estimate effects in non-market regions outside of California because public data is scarce. 
Regulatory bodies like the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and state public utility commissions 
should work to increase the availability of market data to enable more informed policy decisions. A 
possible next step after this analysis includes a more detailed empirical examination of electric 
producers trading with California. As the state continues trading electricity with its neighbors and 
continues its ambitious emissions reductions goals, it is important to better characterize generator 
responses to California electricity policies outside of California. This will lead to a better understanding 
of the full regional impacts from California’s evolving and dynamic energy policies. 
The empiric results of this study suggest significant savings for consumers can be achieved through 
regional electricity market integration, likely well in excess of market implementation costs. However, 
due to data limitations this analysis was not able to estimate consumer costs of regional trade outside of 
California, nor increases in profits to producers who can sell electricity at higher prices in California. This 
analysis provides empirical evidence suggesting improving electricity trade across the western U.S. 
through a regional market will lead to significant near-term monetary benefits, and help reduce CO2 
emissions across the region. It concludes that efforts to expand California’s market to the western U.S. 
should move forward in parallel with strong emissions policies that cover the full market region. 
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